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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, the Supreme Court of the United States has generally 
taken a strict, textualist approach to statutory interpretation.  As a result, in 
several instances the Supreme Court has ruled one way on a specific issue, 
only to have its holding swiftly rebuked by Congressional legislation 
shortly thereafter.  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank” or “Dodd-Frank Act”), passed in July 2010, 
is a prime example of such legislative response. 
In Dodd-Frank, Congress in essence reinstated the “conduct and 
effects” approach to determining the extraterritorial application of anti-
fraud provisions, at least as far as Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) and Government-initiated actions are concerned.  This provision 
largely undermined the landmark Supreme Court decision in Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), decided just three 
weeks prior to Dodd-Frank’s passage.  In Morrison, the Supreme Court had 
rejected the “conduct and effects” tests and instead relied upon the default 
presumption against extraterritorial application of American laws abroad, 
absent express statutory designation. 
Here, I explore the roots of the presumption against extraterritoriality 
and consider the presumption’s utility in the field of Securities Law.  I 
evaluate the application of both the “conduct and effects” and 
“transactional” tests and their implications on private shareholder and SEC- 
or Government-initiated cases through the use of a series of illustrative 
hypotheticals, and propose that the “transactional” test, though simple in 
theory, is unworkable in modern Securities Law.  I propose that, 
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nevertheless, the judiciary should continue a faithful application of the 
presumption against extraterritorial application of American law, as a 
useful mechanism for provoking clarity in statutory language from 
Congress.    
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 24, 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a 
strongly-worded opinion by Justice Scalia, issued its decision in the case of 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,
1
 and revived and strengthened 
the presumption against extraterritoriality once more—this time in the 
context of Section 10(b) securities fraud actions.  The presumption against 
extraterritoriality is a default presumption that American law applies only 
within the territorial sovereignty of the United States, absent a clear, 
contrary intent from Congress within the statute.
2
  This decision effectively 
rejected and nullified decades of prior circuit court jurisprudence that had 
weakened and muddled the application of this presumption in securities 
litigation, particularly in actions with foreign components, replacing it with 
a judicially-malleable “conduct and effects” standard instead.
3
  “Other 
Circuits [had] embraced the Second Circuit’s approach, though not its 
precise application[,] . . . produc[ing] a proliferation of vaguely related 
variations on the ‘conduct’ and ‘effects’ tests [set forth by the Second 
Circuit].”
4
 
However, this decisive pronouncement of the role of the presumption 
against extraterritorial application of domestic law was short-lived.  Less 
than three weeks later, Congress responded to the Supreme Court’s 
decision.  Embedding its reply in the upwards of 2300 pages of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank” or 
“Dodd-Frank Act”), Congress largely rejected the Court’s holding which 
had bolstered the presumption against extraterritoriality by restricting the 
application of Section 10(b) abroad. 
This instance was not the first in which the Supreme Court ruled one 
way on a particular issue, only to have its conclusion severely cut down by 
a swift Congressional response shortly after.  Nor was it the first instance in 
which the Supreme Court ruled, more specifically, on the extent of 
extraterritorial application that should be given to a particular American 
law, only to have Congress respond, re-legislate, and clarify that, in fact, 
the Court reached the wrong conclusion in interpreting legislative intent.  
Such questions of extraterritorial application of American law raise issues 
in the area of Conflict of Laws because often the American law in question, 
when applied to activities occurring abroad, would find a violation, while 
 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 2877. 
 3. Morrison was on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States from 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which had long been the leading 
circuit on the issue of extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 in “predominantly foreign” transactions. 
 4. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880. 
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the local law abroad would not. 
Here, I do not attempt to give the reader a comprehensive overview of 
all Conflicts law.  I begin by discussing, in considerable detail, the 
historical evolution of domestic conflicts of laws to allow the reader to first 
fully recognize the failings and flaws of the strictly territorial approach that 
necessitated the rise of the modern approaches.  Surprisingly, the 
recognition by scholars and courts of the limits of the territorial approach 
and their willingness to adopt new approaches in “domestic conflicts” 
between states has contrasted sharply from American courts’ treatment of 
international conflicts of laws in various areas.  This recurring tendency, 
most recently in securities litigation, will be the primary focus of the 
remainder of this work. 
Specifically, I will review the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison, 
and attempt to reconcile the Court’s holding with both Congress’s swift 
subsequent response in the Dodd-Frank Act, and the current state of flux in 
this area of the law.
5
  As discussed, Morrison is only the most recent case 
in a long history of Supreme Court attempts to first rule definitively on the 
issue of extraterritorial application of a particular American law (generally 
finding a presumption against extraterritoriality), only to have its decision 
then pointedly overturned by a subsequent Act of Congress. 
I will analyze whether the Court or Congress reached the wrong 
conclusion as far as Securities Law is concerned, and evaluate the 
practicality of the “transactional” test established in Morrison. I will then 
consider whether a presumption in favor of territoriality in judicial 
decisions does a poor job of interpreting and matching Congressional intent 
and will also consider the validity of using the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as a judicial mechanism.  The work will also explore why 
the Supreme Court is holding on to such a presumption in the international 
context and thus acting differently in the international context than virtually 
all other modern-day American courts in the domestic context. 
II. DOMESTIC CONFLICT OF LAWS: A BRIEF HISTORY 
Conflict of Laws in the domestic context has undergone several 
transformations in the last hundred years, resulting in markedly different 
approaches from its nineteenth century comity-based origins.
6
  Professor 
Joseph Beale’s “vested rights” or “territoriality” approach replaced the 
haphazard and often inconsistent application of the principle of comity, and 
 
 5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq.) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank 
Act]. 
 6. DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMA H. KAY, LARRY KRAMER & KERMIT ROOSEVELT, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 4–5 (8th ed. 2010). 
WU_FINALIZED_SEVEN (DO NOT DELETE)   
322 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
remained the universally adopted approach by American courts for the first 
half of the twentieth century.
7
  Its key principle was simple:  “[A]ll laws are 
territorially bounded in their operation.”
8
  These “lex loci,” or “place of 
the,” principles placed great emphasis on localizing a particular transaction 
of events, such as the place of an injury, or the place of execution of a 
contract.
9
 
Professor Beale’s approach was grounded in the idea that a sovereign 
possesses exclusive authority to create laws to govern all events and actions 
arising within its own territorial boundaries, but lacks authority to create 
laws that govern the events and actions occurring outside of its boundaries, 
in another sovereign’s jurisdiction.
10
  However, as one conflicts scholar 
artfully described, “The ink was hardly dry on the First Restatement of 
Conflicts [which reflected Professor Beale’s approach] when the attacks 
began.”
11
  Professor Beale’s territorial approach was fiercely criticized 
almost from its inception.
12
 
Professor Beale’s territorialist approach prioritized three core values: 
uniformity, predictability, and discouragement of forum-shopping.
13
  Ease 
of application emerged as a secondary benefit, at least in theory.
14
 
However, as Professor Beale’s critics had already forecasted, courts 
quickly realized that the steadfast, mechanical adherence to lex loci 
principles of territoriality often led to absurd, arbitrary results.
15
  As 
technology and transportation advanced, many courts began to find that the 
theoretical value of neatly defined territoriality, based strictly on state lines, 
no longer held pragmatic appeal.  Parties gained mobility, and 
“identify[ing] the unique location in which the rights ‘vested’ . . . was not 
so easy when the transactions in question were spread across state lines.”
16
 
By the mid-twentieth century, it had become common practice for 
courts to consider “escape devices,” such as characterization or public 
policy, to achieve more intuitively equitable results.  By doing so, courts 
creatively circumvented otherwise absurd outcomes that resulted from 
strict territoriality.
17
  Though these escape devices were “quick-fix” options 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (CONCEPTS AND INSIGHTS SERIES) 3 (2010). 
 9. Id. at 6–14. 
 10. Id. at 3. 
 11. LEA BRILMAYER, PERSPECTIVES ON THE LAW: CONFLICT OF LAWS 22 (1991). 
 12. ROOSEVELT, supra note 8, at 33. 
 13. CURRIE ET AL., supra note 6, at 9. 
 14. ROOSEVELT, supra note 8, at 29–31. 
 15. See, e.g., Ala. Great S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892) (denying 
recovery to an Alabama employee-plaintiff who had entered into an employment contract in 
Alabama, with his Alabama employer-defendant for an injury sustained in Mississippi, in 
order to avoid giving Alabama tort law extraterritorial scope). 
 16. BRILMAYER, supra note 11, at 22. 
 17. See, e.g., Levy v. Daniels’ U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A. 163, 164–65 (Conn. 
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available to the courts on a case-by-case basis, they gradually chiseled 
away at territoriality’s proclaimed benefits of uniformity and predictability. 
The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the development of 
two major “modern approaches” in the United States by legal scholars and 
courts.
18
  The first, Professor Brainerd Currie’s articles on “Governmental 
Interest Analysis,” marked an instrumental divergence from Professor 
Beale’s traditional approach.
19
  The second, the American Law Institute’s 
Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, was completed in 1971.
20
  Both 
modern approaches demonstrated an awareness of the need for a flexible 
approach by emphasizing a thorough inquiry into the state interest, public 
policy, and relative significance of relationships between the involved 
parties and different possible jurisdictions, when determining whether to 
apply a particular state’s law over another’s in a given case.
21
 
Although a few state jurisdictions still apply Professor Beale’s strict 
geographical approach to conflicts of law, variations on interest analysis or 
the Second Restatement have largely replaced territoriality in the domestic 
arena.
22
  Yet, in the foreign affairs arena involving causes of action that 
often contain certain international elements, there has been longstanding 
dissonance between Supreme Court jurisprudence that has clung to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality in its treatment of American laws, 
and an often swift subsequent Congressional reaction against such an 
approach in response. 
III. INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS: A BRIEF HISTORY 
A.  Roots of Extraterritorial Application of American Law:  American 
Banana Company v. United Fruit Company 
In the early twentieth century, during the heyday of Professor Beale’s 
territorial approach to Conflicts, the Supreme Court decided a landmark 
case that affirmatively entrenched the application of principles of 
 
1928) (characterizing plaintiff’s cause of action as arising from a contract formed in 
Connecticut, rather than a tort occurring in Massachusetts, to apply Connecticut law to 
allow plaintiff to recover). 
 18. See CURRIE ET AL., supra note 6, ch. 2. 
 19. See Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws 
Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958) (analyzing a hallmark lex loci contractus case from 
the perspective of interest analysis). 
 20. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). 
 21. Id. § 6. 
 22. Because the focus of this work is on territoriality’s role in international affairs, I 
will not elaborate on the variations of Interest Analysis as they exist today.  For a more 
comprehensive discussion of the different approaches, see ROOSEVELT, supra note 8, ch. 2–
3. 
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territoriality (and its corollary, a presumption against extraterritoriality), 
which had been applied in domestic conflicts of law between sister-states, 
in resolving international conflicts between nations. 
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
23
 the Supreme Court 
faced the issue of interpreting whether the reach of the Sherman Act 
antitrust provisions extended to activities occurring outside of the United 
States.  An Alabama-incorporated plaintiff sued a New Jersey-incorporated 
defendant, alleging that the New Jersey defendant-corporation had induced 
Costa Rica to interfere with the Alabama plaintiff-corporation’s banana 
export business venture in Costa Rica through improper collusion with the 
neighboring Panamanian government.
24
  Among its factual allegations, the 
plaintiff claimed that defendants “outbid . . . [and drove] purchasers out of 
the market . . . and . . . prevented the plaintiff from buying for export and 
sale.”
25
  In alleging these facts, plaintiffs cited and relied upon the antitrust 
provisions of the Sherman Act.
26
 
The trial court was not convinced, and subsequently dismissed the 
complaint.
27
  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
(“Second Circuit”) affirmed, and the Supreme Court upheld the lower 
courts’ decisions.  The Supreme Court, in its opinion, marveled at the 
plaintiff’s attempt to invoke the Sherman Act, given that “the acts causing 
the damage were done . . . outside the jurisdiction of the United States.”
28
  
The Court found it “surprising to hear it argued that [the activities 
occurring outside the United States] were governed by the act of 
Congress.”
29
  The Court held that “[a]ll legislation is prima facie 
territorial.”
30
 
B.  Impact of American Banana on Subsequent Questions of 
Extraterritoriality 
In other words, when the reach of a statute is unclear, it should be 
interpreted “to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits 
over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.”
31
  After 
American Banana, courts applied this default presumption against 
extraterritorial application in similar antitrust cases without complication or 
 
 23. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
 24. Id. at 354–55. 
 25. Id. at 355. 
 26. Id. at 353. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 355. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 357. 
 31. Id. 
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confusion for almost three decades.
32
  However, the phrasing of the 
doctrine evolved and, by the mid-1940s, the Supreme Court had slowly 
modified the original language of American Banana through each 
application.  Eventually, the phrasing of the standard allowed for the 
application of American law to control activities abroad that merely 
“affected” United States commerce.
33
  The Supreme Court eventually found 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act proper when applied to 
“conduct abroad that is intended to and does affect United States 
commerce.”  Ironically, this was the very interpretation rejected in 
American Banana.
34
 
Having unwittingly and inadvertently turned its holding in American 
Banana on its head, the Supreme Court began applying this “effects” 
approach to cases stemming from the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”).
35
  This dilution of American Banana’s 
original clear presumption against extraterritoriality led to great 
inconsistencies in different contexts and areas of law. 
Territoriality connotes an idea of a limitation on a given law’s 
applicability to the confines of the jurisdiction that had the power to create 
the law; its converse, extraterritoriality, can be thought of as an expansion 
of the force of a law beyond the geographical boundaries of the jurisdiction 
that created it.  It is important to note that in perpetuating the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, courts have not explicitly held that the 
extraterritorial application of American law is categorically forbidden per 
se. 
To the contrary, when Congress explicitly specifies its intent that a 
statute apply to certain activities occurring abroad, then extraterritorial 
application of the statute is upheld by courts.
36
  However, more often than 
not, the statutory language is silent on this issue.  In these cases, without a 
clear, express indication from Congress, most courts have held that the 
jurisdictional scope of American law should be confined to apply only to 
events occurring within American territorial boundaries.  This is an 
illustration of the presumption against extraterritoriality at work. 
In the decades since American Banana, courts have generally 
followed this “longstanding principle of American law that legislation of 
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within 
 
 32. Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 
1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179 (1991). 
 33. Id. at 180. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (1982) (stating 
applicability of Act to “[e]mployment in foreign countries and certain United States 
territories”). 
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the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”
37
  Courts have traditionally 
held that without first finding clear, express intent in the legislation itself, 
courts will interpret the laws to limit their applicability and effect to the 
United States; in other words, there is a presumption against 
extraterritoriality.
38
  If an American law’s application to events with 
international elements abroad is intended by Congress, then Congress 
should take care to so state in clear, unambiguous terms within the statute. 
IV.  MORRISON AND ITS IMPACT ON EXISTING SECURITIES LITIGATION 
By October Term 2009, securities litigation in American courts— 
particularly in cases involving activities with certain international 
implications—was primed for a decisive ruling by the Supreme Court.  
Morrison was decided against a backdrop of several decades of cases 
where the litmus test for whether to apply Rule 10b-5’s anti-fraud 
provisions, which banned fraud in securities transactions, depended on 
whether a court had “‘discern[ed’ that] Congress would have wanted the 
statute to apply” to a given set of facts.
39
  This post facto case-by-case 
speculation of “what Congress would have wanted” contributed to high 
unpredictability and inconsistency within the case law. 
The Supreme Court issued its unanimous ruling in Morrison on June 
24, 2010, in an 8–0 opinion written by Justice Scalia.
40
  In Morrison, the 
Court addressed the question of “whether [S]ection 10(b) gives rise to a 
private cause of action [arising from alleged fraud in the trade of] securities 
that are traded outside of the territory of the United States.”
41
  In holding 
that it did not, the Supreme Court sought to clarify the standards for 
determining when and whether Section 10(b) should be applied to alleged 
fraudulent activities occurring abroad, in securities litigation initiated by 
private shareholders. 
 
 37. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 
244, 248 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 38. “Extraterritoriality” is used here to describe the application of American laws to 
events or activities occurring abroad.  For more detail, see American Banana Co. v. United 
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (finding a narrow interpretation of American antitrust laws 
in the absence of clear extraterritorial application in statutory language, regardless of the 
fact that challenged activities abroad were conducted by American companies). 
 39. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).  
 40. Id. at 2869.  Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of the 
case. 
 41. Luke Green, Morrison v. National Australia Bank—The Dawn of a New Age?, 
RISKMETRICS GROUP INSIGHT SECURITIES LITIGATION BLOG (June 25, 2010, 5:54 PM), 
http://www.blog.riskmetrics.com/slw/2010/06/morrison-v-national-australia-bank---the-daw 
n-of-a-new-age.html. 
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A.  Securities Litigation, Prior to Morrison 
The 1934 Act and its key anti-fraud provisions in Section 10(b), along 
with Rule 10b-5, have been “famously silent” as to their extraterritorial 
application.
42
  On its face, the anti-fraud provision of Section 10(b) does 
not seem to apply extraterritorially, since the plain language of the statute 
does not clearly state that it will. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act states that: 
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of 
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . 
. [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any 
security not so registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may 
prescribe.
43
 
Rule 10b-5 states, in relevant part, that it is unlawful for any person to 
“engage in any act, practice, or course of business which . . . would operate 
as a fraud . . . upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security.”
44
 
Because Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) under the authority granted in Section 10(b), Rule 
10b-5’s application “does not extend beyond conduct encompassed by 
[S]ection 10(b)’s prohibition.”
45
  In other words, if Section 10(b) has no 
extraterritorial application, Rule 10b-5 does not either.  Rule 10b-5’s 
breadth is only as wide as Section 10(b)’s breadth.
46
 
Theoretically, this appears simple enough.  It would make sense to 
deduce that because Section 10(b) does not clearly state that it will apply 
extraterritorially, it will not.  Correspondingly, Rule 10b-5 would not 
either.  However, in the decades prior to the long-overdue Morrison 
decision, securities litigation instead involved great exercise of discretion 
by the courts.
47
  During the forty years leading up to Morrison, courts 
considered the “extraterritorial application of the securities laws to foreign 
transactions as a question of subject matter jurisdiction.”
48
 
 
 42. Erez Reuveni, Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of the 
Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1071, 1081 
(2010). 
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (cited in Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882). 
 44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
 45. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 
(1997)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Reuveni, supra note 42, at 1074. 
 48. Id. 
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Starting in 1968, the Second Circuit adopted a case-by-case approach, 
and on that basis decided whether it would be reasonable to apply Rule 
10b-5 anew each time questions of its applicability arose in a particular 
case.
49
  Under this approach, courts considered the “underlying purpose of 
the anti-fraud provisions” to determine “whether Congress would have 
wished the precious resources of the United States courts and law 
enforcement agencies to be devoted to such transactions.”
50
 
A line of cases from the Second Circuit applied the “conduct test” and 
“effects test” in determining the reach of Section 10(b).
51
  In applying these 
so-called “conduct and effects tests,” the court inquired whether (1) the 
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred in the United States, and            
(2) “whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United 
States or upon United States citizens.”
52
  The Court would then apply this 
test to determine whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 
claim.
53
 
Unsurprisingly, the repeated application of the “conduct and effects 
tests” on a case-by-case basis resulted in great unpredictability and 
arbitrariness, creating “a collection of tests for divining what Congress 
would have wanted, complex in formulation and unpredictable in 
application.”
54
 
However, prior to the Morrison decision and the Dodd-Frank Act 
shortly thereafter, Congress had seemed perfectly content in allowing the 
judiciary to continue this case-by-case inquiry in determining whether to 
hear Rule 10b-5 claims arising out of allegedly wrongful international 
activities in securities litigation cases.
55
  For decades, Congress made no 
attempts to clarify the extraterritorial reach of the 1934 Act’s anti-fraud 
provisions by statute.
56
  In essence, the courts had stepped into a quasi-
legislative role—this should give democratic societies pause.  In fact, in the 
Morrison opinion, Justice Scalia criticized the “judicial-speculation-made-
law” that resulted from courts taking it upon themselves to decide when 
and whether Section 10(b) should apply.
57
 
 
 49. Lyle Denniston, Stock Fraud Law: For U.S. Only, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2010, 
5:43 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=22167. 
 50. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Eur. & 
Overseas Commodity Traders S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 
1998)), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 51. Id. at 171 (citing Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 
1983)). 
 52. Id. (emphasis added). 
 53. Id. at 172. 
 54. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 55. Reuveni, supra note 42, at 1073. 
 56. The potential motivations for this will be explored later in the analysis found in Part 
VI below. 
 57. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881; see also Denniston, supra note 49 (asserting that 
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B.  Morrison in the District Court and Second Circuit 
In Morrison, the key issue presented was whether Section 10(b) of the 
1934 Act provided a viable cause of action to “foreign plaintiffs suing 
foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with 
securities traded on foreign exchanges.”
58
  This so-called “foreign-cubed,” 
or “f-cubed,” securities case presented an issue of first impression for the 
Second Circuit.
59
 
Defendant-respondent National Australia Bank Limited (“NAB”) 
“was, during the relevant time, the largest bank in Australia.”
60
  The three 
plaintiffs-petitioners were Australians who had purchased NAB’s 
“Ordinary Shares” in 2000 and 2001.
61
  “Ordinary Shares” are similar to 
American “common stock,” but are “traded on the Australian Stock 
Exchange Limited and on other foreign securities exchanges, but not on 
any exchange in the United States.”
62
  In 1998, NAB had purchased a 
Florida-based mortgage servicing company and reported the value of the 
U.S. subsidiary’s assets in NAB’s financial statements.
63
  From 1998 until 
2001, these financial statements, along with the public statements of both 
NAB’s and its subsidiary’s directors and executives, “touted the success” 
of the subsidiary’s value in assets.
64
 
Suddenly, in 2001, NAB wrote down the value of the subsidiary’s 
assets twice, resulting in a major slump in Ordinary Shares prices.
65
  
Petitioners alleged that this slump in prices negatively affected the value of 
their investments in NAB’s stock.
66
 
Australian Petitioners brought suit against NAB in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York.
67
  Having bought 
their Ordinary Shares before the write-downs, Petitioners alleged that they 
suffered financial losses as a result of NAB’s actions.
68
  Petitioners alleged 
that NAB was aware of the deception in its financial models as early as 
July 2000, “but did nothing about it” and continued to misrepresent the 
 
“[w]ith evident sarcasm, Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion for the Court rapped Circuit 
Courts for having created, by judicial invention, the authority to decide such lawsuits when 
filed by private investors”). 
 58. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875 (emphasis added). 
 59. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 60. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875. 
 61. Id. at 2876. 
 62. Id. at 2875. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 2876. 
 66. Denniston, supra note 49. 
 67. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876. 
 68. Id. 
WU_FINALIZED_SEVEN (DO NOT DELETE)   
330 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
supposed worth of its and its subsidiary’s assets, to Petitioners’ detriment.
69
  
Petitioners relied on the anti-fraud provisions of Section 10(b) of the 1934 
Act, as well as Section 20(a), in their claim against NAB.
70
 
The district court dismissed Petitioners’ claim for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
71
  
The Second Circuit affirmed on similar grounds, applying its Circuit 
precedent in asking what “conduct” Section 10(b) reaches, as part of its 
developed “conduct and effects tests.”
72
 
C.  Morrison in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court took a much stricter textualist approach and, 
although it affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision, it affirmed on different 
grounds, definitively discarding the “conduct and effects tests.”  The 
Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit’s affirmation of the district 
court’s dismissal on subject matter jurisdiction grounds, stating that an 
inquiry into the reach of Section 10(b) is a merits question, while subject 
matter jurisdiction “refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a case.”
73
  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s ruling on 
alternative grounds, relying instead on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).
74
 
Once the Supreme Court decided that the issue presented was a 
merits-based question subject to a possible 12(b)(6) dismissal, it considered 
the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b).  In doing so, it revived the 
strength of the longstanding presumption that “unless there is the 
affirmative intention . . . clearly expressed to give a statute extraterritorial 
effect, [the Court] must presume it is primarily concerned with domestic 
conditions.”
75
 
The Court then “reviewed the sequence of Second Circuit . . . cases 
applying [S]ection 10(b) to various foreign transactions, summarizing the 
Second Circuit’s jurisprudence with evident distaste.”
76
  The Court 
criticized the Second Circuit’s longtime practice of “discern[ing] whether 
Congress would have wanted the statute to apply” in these Section 10(b) 
securities fraud cases.
77
  The Court distinguished the differences between 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2876–77. 
 73. Id. at 2877 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76. John R. Crook, U.S. Supreme Court Limits Extraterritorial Reach of Securities 
Laws, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 654, 655 (2010). 
 77. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the practices of using “congressional silence as a justification for judge-
made rules,” from the traditional presumption that silence simply means no 
extraterritorial application, and rebuked the former.
78
  The Court made clear 
its abrogation of the Second Circuit jurisprudence’s “conduct and effects 
tests,” citing among its reasons both the difficulty in administering these 
tests as well as the unpredictability in their application.
79
 
Ultimately, the Court held that the focus of the 1934 Act did not turn 
upon “where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of 
securities in the United States.”
80
  By so finding, the Court limited the 
applicability of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and therefore Rule 10b-5, to 
“only transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic 
transactions in other securities.”
81
  Merely because there is some connection 
with the United States, for instance if one or both parties are American 
citizens, is not enough to trigger the application of Section 10(b). 
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court rejected the longtime 
“conduct and effects tests” of Second Circuit jurisprudence in favor of the 
more decisive, bright-line “transactional” test.  In so holding, the Court 
stated that Section 10(b) applies to prohibit fraud or deception in “the use 
of a manipulative or deceptive device . . . only in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and 
the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.”
82
  The 
Court’s opinion in Morrison seems to be clear and unambiguous, 
“drastically rein[ing] in the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities fraud 
laws.”
83
  Because Petitioners in Morrison purchased Ordinary Shares on a 
foreign exchange, not traded in the United States, they were unable to rely 
on Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in their claim for relief under the new 
“transactional” test, and the Court held for Respondent NAB. 
D.  Post-Morrison Federal Jurisprudence 
While investors and courts everywhere awaited the decision in 
Morrison, many other private securities fraud actions against major 
multinational corporations were pending.  Though not all were “f-cubed” 
cases, many did involve stocks that were purchased on foreign stock 
exchanges, often by American shareholders.  Since the Morrison opinion 
was handed down, lower federal district courts have generally tried to 
adhere to the Supreme Court’s revival of the presumption against 
 
 78. Id. at 2881. 
 79. Id. at 2879. 
 80. Id. at 2884. 
 81. Id. (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. at 2888 (emphasis added). 
 83. Green, supra note 41. 
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extraterritoriality.
84
  These courts have recognized that the prior “conduct 
and effects tests” developed by the Second Circuit is now “dead letter”
85
 
and instead are deferring to the “transactional” test set out in Morrison.  A 
faithful adherence to Morrison has already resulted in the “dismissal of 
several significant securities fraud class actions.”
86
 
However, the purportedly bright-line “transactional” test in Morrison 
has met with criticism from other courts, for the difficulty in its application 
and arbitrariness of such a territoriality-dependent test.  Recall that these 
are reminiscent of the criticism of Professor Beale’s territorial approach in 
domestic Conflict of Laws, described above in Part II. 
1. Support for the “Transactional” Test 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison, several lower district 
courts have begun applying the “transactional” test, which has resulted in 
dismissals of pending claims.  For instance, in Cornwell v. Credit Suisse 
Group, plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Class Action Complaint on 
March 10, 2010, several weeks before Morrison was argued at the Supreme 
Court.
87
  In July 2010, in light of the Morrison decision, Credit Suisse 
Group (“CSG”) moved to dismiss a certain subset of the class of American 
resident plaintiffs (“subclass”) who had purchased CSG shares on the 
Swiss Stock Exchange.
88
 
Faithfully upholding the strict holding in Morrison, the trial court 
granted CSG’s motion to dismiss this subclass of plaintiffs.
89
  
Unfortunately for these subclass plaintiffs, their arguments and attempts to 
distinguish their case from Morrison by pointing out that this subclass 
“made an investment decision and initiated a purchase . . . from the U.S.” 
fell on deaf ears.
90
  The Cornwell court cited the Supreme Court’s 
“unequivocal[] repudiat[ion of the] longstanding jurisprudence” of the 
Second Circuit’s “conduct and effects tests,” and rejected plaintiffs’ 
attempt to limit Morrison to its facts.
91
  In faithfully following the Supreme 
 
 84. See, e.g., Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss and rejecting Plaintiffs’ Section 10(b) arguments 
on the grounds that the foreign transaction involved some U.S. contact). 
 85. Id. at 622. 
 86. E-mail from Frank Partnoy et al., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Comments by Forty-Two Law Professors in 
Response to SEC Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action (Feb. 18, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-28.pdf. 
 87. Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 621. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 622. 
 90. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91. Id. at 623. 
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Court’s holding in Morrison, the Cornwell court rejected the subclass’s 
attempt to carve out a distinction from Morrison, on the argument that the 
foreign transaction did involve the “occurrence of some activities or 
contracts in the United States.”
92
 
The Cornwell court, following Morrison, stated that “even in strictly 
foreign securities purchases or sales to which the reach of [S]ection 10(b) 
squarely does not extend, some connection of the transaction with the 
United States is always highly likely,” and found such incidental 
connections insufficient for extraterritorial application.
93
  The Cornwell 
court further bolstered the new bright-line “transactional” test set forth in 
Morrison, reiterating that the focus of the 1934 Exchange Act is “not upon 
the place where the deception originated[,]” but instead on purchases and 
sales of securities in the United States.
94
  Many other courts have since 
dismissed private shareholder actions as well, as a result of Morrison.
95
 
2. Criticism of the “Transactional” Test 
In theory, the “transactional” test appears simple:  alleged fraud in 
transactions on foreign exchanges will not give rise to Section 10(b) 
claims, “even if [the transactions caused] some domestic impact or 
effect.”
96
  Recall that in American Banana, the Supreme Court declined to 
apply the Sherman Act to activities in Costa Rica, even though these 
activities arguably impacted American companies stateside. 
However, despite the Supreme Court’s best efforts to create a bright-
line rule in Morrison, certain situations have already presented the 
shortcomings of the Morrison “transactional” test.  For example, In re 
Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation
97
 was a consolidated class 
action originally filed in 2002, on behalf of U.S. and foreign shareholders 
of Vivendi, a French company.
98
  These shareholders had purchased either 
ordinary shares, listed and traded on foreign exchanges, or American 
Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”), listed and traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange (“NYSE”).
99
  The plaintiff shareholders alleged that the company 
 
 92. Id. at 626. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2874 (2010)). 
 95. See, e.g., In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Elliot Assocs. v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Partnoy et al., supra note 86, at 13–18 (reviewing several recent 
developments in high-profile private securities litigation cases, many of which have been 
dismissed in the wake of the Morrison decision). 
 96. Denniston, supra note 49. 
 97. 765 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 98. Id. at 520. 
 99. Id. at 521. 
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violated Section 10(b) anti-fraud provisions by making misrepresentations 
that resulted in artificially-inflated prices, which led to their eventual 
financial losses.
100
 
After a lengthy pre-trial period, the case went to a jury trial in late 
2009.
101
  In early 2010, the jury rendered its verdict against Vivendi, 
finding that Vivendi had violated Section 10(b) by making fifty-seven 
specific misstatements which resulted in artificially-inflated prices during 
the relevant period.
102
  Post-trial motions in Vivendi were pending when the 
Supreme Court issued its decision in Morrison in June 2010.  In light of 
this decision, the Vivendi court requested that the parties “submit 
supplemental briefs addressing the impact of Morrison on the pending 
motions.”
103
 
Neither party disputed that “Morrison ha[d] no impact on the claims 
of ADR purchasers since [the] ADRs were listed and traded on the 
NYSE.”
104
  However, the plaintiffs claimed that because Vivendi was 
required to register the number of ordinary shares on the NYSE in the 
process of its public offering in ADR form, these ordinary shares “listed” 
on the NYSE satisfied Morrison’s transactional test for Section 10(b) 
application to “securities listed on domestic exchanges.”
105
  Vivendi 
disagreed, arguing that these “listed” shares were not for trading purposes, 
and thus this technicality was not consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
rationale in Morrison.
106
 
The Vivendi court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’ argument, finding 
“no indication that the Morrison [opinion] read Section 10(b) as applying 
to securities that may be cross-listed on domestic and foreign exchanges . . . 
where the purchase and sale does not arise from the domestic listing.”
107
 
Instead, the court relied on the “spirit of Morrison” analysis employed by 
other trial courts, which considered the Morrison “transactional” test 
holistically, focusing primarily on the territorial location of the action.
108
 
Though the Supreme Court’s attempt to clarify and define an easy-to-
use, bright-line “transactional” test in Morrison is commendable from a 
jurisprudential perspective, Vivendi illustrates the narrowness of the 
 
 100. Id. at 533. 
 101. Id. at 523. 
 102. Id. at 524. 
 103. Id. at 525. 
 104. Id. at 527. 
 105. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 106. Id. at 527–28. 
 107. Id. at 531. 
 108. Id. at 530 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. 
PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 
741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Sgalambo v. McKenzie, 739 F. Supp. 2d 453, 
487 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
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Morrison holding, and the Supreme Court’s failure in contemplating the 
“transactional” test’s application in other real-life, practical circumstances 
in securities litigation, such as cross-listing or ADRs.
109
 
V.  THE DODD-FRANK ACT, SECTIONS 929P AND 929Y 
A.  Introduction to the Act 
The Supreme Court’s sweeping reaffirmation of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality in Morrison did not last.  Whatever force the 
Court may have intended to restore to the presumption in securities fraud 
litigation on Section 10(b) claims was quickly frustrated by Congress’s 
swift passage of the Dodd-Frank Act on July 10, 2010, less than three 
weeks after the Morrison opinion was issued.
110
  To say the Dodd-Frank 
Act is exceedingly comprehensive would be an understatement.
111
  Legal 
scholars, policy makers, courts, lawyers, and financial institutions have 
waded through its upwards of 2300 pages, searching for “hidden provisions 
of the bill that most people have yet to notice.”
112
  The United States Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs issued a brief 
summary outlining the impetus for the legislation to aid the public’s 
understanding of the new legislation.
113
  Among the highlights listed in the 
summary include Dodd-Frank’s new provisions to “[s]trengthen[] oversight 
and empower[] regulators to aggressively pursue financial fraud . . . that 
benefits special interests at the expense of American families and 
businesses.”
114
  The pertinent section of Dodd-Frank that impacts the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison is Section 929 of the Act. 
B. Section 929 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
Section 929 has the greatest direct impact on the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Morrison.  Section 929P is titled, “Strengthening enforcement 
 
 109. Additional real-life scenarios in which the “transactional” test falls short are 
explored below.  See discussion infra Part VI.B. 
 110. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 111. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Finding a Good Financial Bill in 2,300 Pages, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES DEALBOOK (July 15, 2010, 12:05 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/finding-a-good-financial-bill-in-2300-pages/. 
 112. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 113. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS, 111TH CONG., 
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM: CONFERENCE REPORT SUMMARY (Comm. Print 2010) 
(highlighting various provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act to help the public navigate through 
the legislation), http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_ 
Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf. 
 114. Id. at 2. 
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by the [Securities and Exchange] Commission.”
115
  Section 929P provides 
in relevant part that: 
[D]istrict courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction of 
an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the [Securities 
and Exchange] Commission or the United States alleging a 
violation of the antifraud provisions . . . involving— 
(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes 
significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the 
securities transaction occurs outside the United States and 
involves only foreign investors; or 
(2)  conduct occurring outside the United States that has a 
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.
116
 
In other words, the plain statutory language in Section 929P of Dodd-
Frank apparently rebukes the Supreme Court’s Morrison decision, to the 
extent that it applies to actions brought by the SEC and the Federal 
Government.  At least, this is the understanding that much of the legal 
community seems to have agreed upon.  However, it is important to note 
that Section 929P itself is poorly drafted and ambiguous; specifically, it 
never deliberately states that it is expressly reversing the Court’s opinion in 
Morrison, nor does it explicitly state that it is restoring the Second Circuit’s 
“conduct and effects test.”  Instead, Section 929P states in clear, 
unambiguous terms that any United States court will, going forward, have 
jurisdiction to hear any action brought by the SEC or the Government with 
respect to violations, even those occurring outside the United States, of the 
anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act.
117
  Having jurisdiction, or “power to 
hear a case,” is “an issue quite separate from the question whether the 
allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief.”
118
 
Assuming, arguendo, the validity of what the legal community has 
presumed is a rejection of Morrison, at least with respect to SEC and 
Government actions, Section 929P extends the application of Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5’s reach, when relied on by the SEC in pursuing violations 
or by the Government in criminal prosecutions, even when the securities 
transaction occurred outside of the United States.
119
  Dodd-Frank provides 
that Section 10(b) may apply to such purely foreign transactions if the 
proceeding is commenced by the SEC or the Government. 
 
 115. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P.  
 116. Id. (emphasis added). 
 117. Edward F. Greene, Dodd-Frank: a lesson in decision avoidance, 6 CAPITAL MKTS. 
L.J. 29, 70 (2010). 
 118. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).  
 119. Id. 
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C. Section 929’s Impact on Morrison 
After Dodd-Frank, the Act’s impact on the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Morrison can best be understood by conceptualizing the Supreme 
Court’s finding of a presumption against extraterritoriality in Morrison as 
bifurcated, between two discrete categories:  (1) actions brought by private 
litigants and (2) actions brought by the SEC or the Government. 
Because the Dodd-Frank Act, as it currently reads, is silent on the 
restriction of Section 10(b)’s applicability to private causes of action, the 
holding in Morrison barring extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) to 
Category (1) private litigant actions remains undisturbed.  At first blush, 
Congressional silence on the issue of Section 929P’s effect on private 
actions seems to be, ironically, the same lack of clarity that created the 
initial confusion regarding Section 10(b)’s extraterritorial application in the 
first place.  However, Section 929Y requires the SEC to solicit public 
commentary on whether this “conduct and effects” analysis should be 
extended to private actions, and file a report with Congress accordingly.
120
  
Additional discussion of these public comments follows in Part VI.A. 
Considering the Morrison opinion together with Sections 929P and 
929Y of Dodd-Frank, it is clear that the Act weakened the force of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Category (2) SEC- and Government-
enforcement actions.  Dodd-Frank severely curtailed the Supreme Court’s 
blanket prohibition of extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) without 
clear, explicit congressional intent, and rejected the strong presumption 
against extraterritoriality, specifically in cases where foreign stocks were 
purchased on foreign exchanges. 
Dodd-Frank effectively reinstated the “conduct and effects test” that 
Morrison had discarded, at least in the context of SEC- and Government-
initiated actions. 
VI.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Ultimate Significance of the Private Versus SEC- or Government-
Initiated Distinction Might Be Rendered Moot 
The ultimate importance of whether an action is brought by private 
litigants, as opposed to the SEC or the Government, is yet to be 
determined.  As written, Section 929P has generally been understood to 
partially reverse Morrison, at least to the extent that it reinstated a similar 
“conduct and effects test” for determining extraterritorial application of 
Section 10(b) anti-fraud provisions to actions brought by the SEC or 
 
 120. Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y.  
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Government.
121
  However, Section 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act required 
the SEC to conduct a study as to whether private rights of action should be 
subject to the same “conduct and effects” analysis.
122
  Accordingly, the 
SEC requested public commentary by February 18, 2011, regarding the 
potential expansion of Section 929P’s application from SEC- or 
Government-initiated actions to private actions and “the circumstances, if 
any, in which a private plaintiff should be allowed to pursue [a Section 
10(b) securities fraud claim under] the Exchange Act with respect to a 
particular security where the plaintiff has purchased or sold the security 
outside the United States.”
123
  Section 929Y further required that the SEC 
submit a report of the study to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the 
House within eighteen months of  Dodd-Frank’s enactment.
124
 
Among the more prominent comments submitted was a joint 
submission by forty-two law professors from law schools around the 
country.
125
  In the comment, the professors stated that, despite their 
acknowledged personal differences of opinion regarding the efficacy of 
securities class actions and the extent of private shareholders’ rights, as a 
group they “believe[d] reform efforts should be applied consistently and 
logically to both domestic and affected foreign issuers” and, thus, 
“support[ed] extending the test set forth in Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank 
. . . Act . . . to [actions brought by] private plaintiffs.”
126
 
Legal scholars, interested parties, and foreign governments alike can 
expect to see the SEC’s recommendations and report to Congress by 
January 2012, at which time the SEC’s eighteen-month period to submit a 
report to Congress will expire.  Currently, it is impossible to predict not 
only what the agency will recommend, but furthermore whether Congress 
will take steps to extend the restored “conduct and effects-like” test in 
Section 929P to private rights of action after receiving the report.  It will be 
interesting to see what legislative changes, if any, public commentary such 
as this may yield, and important to note how the SEC will consider public 
opinions such as the one from the professors, moving forward.  Perhaps 
 
 121. Id. § 929P. 
 122. Id. § 929Y. 
 123. Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action Request for Comments, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-63174, 2010 WL 4196006 (October 25, 2010). 
 124. Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y. 
 125. Partnoy et al., supra note 86; see also Barbara Black, 42 Law Profs Support 
Extending Dodd-Frank’s Extraterritorial Test to Private Claims, SEC. LAW PROF BLOG 
(Feb. 28, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/2011/02/law-profs-support-
extending-dodd-franks-extraterritorial-test-to-private-claims.html (reporting the joint 
submission by law professors and its implications, on blog site maintained by Barbara 
Black, one of the forty-two professors who submitted the joint commentary). 
 126. Partnoy et al., supra note 86, at 5. 
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Congress will attempt to legislate more definitively on the issue of 
extraterritorial application of anti-fraud provisions to extend Dodd-Frank’s 
Section 929P language to private causes of action in the future.  If 
Congress does in fact amend the statutory language to apply the two-prong 
test in Section 929P of Dodd-Frank to private actions as well, as the 
professors are recommending, the force of the Morrison opinion will be 
fully reversed and rendered virtually toothless. 
B.  Pragmatically, Morrison’s Substantive Outcome and Effect on 
Securities Litigation Was Wrong 
As a substantive legal issue for securities law, the Court’s holding in 
Morrison that Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act had no extraterritorial 
application to allegedly fraudulent activities occurring on foreign 
exchanges was impractical.  It is important to distinguish between the 
“substantive outcome” and “procedural outcome” of Morrison.  The 
“procedural outcome” is discussed in Part VI.C below. 
1. The Decision in Morrison Was Impractical for Modern Securities 
Litigation 
There is a practical problem with the Court’s attempt to set forth the 
bright-line “transactional” test in Morrison.  Simply put, geographically 
localizing the listing of the transacted share as “domestic” or “foreign” to 
decide whether Section 10(b) “does apply” or “does not apply,” 
respectively, is arbitrary.  As discussed previously in Part II above, such a 
strictly geographically-focused approach, though easy in its application, 
often reaches absurd and counter-intuitive results.  Potential for such 
arbitrariness and unfairness exists under the Morrison “transactional” test. 
For example, consider the following hypothetical scenario:
127
 
Vrooom! Motor Corporation stock is listed and traded on 
both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange (TSE). 
 
 127. Interview with Jill Fisch, Perry Golkin Professor of Law and Co-Director of the 
Inst. for Law and Econ., Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., in Phila., Pa. (Mar. 24, 2011).  Professor 
Fisch is an expert in the fields of securities regulation and corporate governance, and is one 
of the forty-two professors who submitted the joint comment to the SEC, as discussed above 
in Part VI.A.  Many thanks to Professor Fisch for her time and, particularly, for using this 
hypothetical in explaining the concrete effects of the Morrison holding.  A graphical 
representation of these hypothetical scenarios in Part VI.B can be found in the Appendix, in 
Figures 1 and 2. 
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Investor A decides to purchase Vrooom! stock and calls her 
stockbroker with this investment in mind.  The stockbroker 
acts accordingly and purchases shares on the NYSE. 
Investor B decides to purchase Vrooom! stock and calls his 
stockbroker with this investment in mind.  The stockbroker 
acts accordingly and purchases shares on the TSE. 
Evidence of fraudulent activity comes to light, and both 
Investors A and B incur identical substantial financial 
losses. 
To illustrate the practical realities of territoriality’s drawbacks, under 
the “transactional” test set forth in Morrison, Investor A would have access 
to a legal remedy in a United States court by asserting a Section 10(b) 
claim, because her stock was listed and purchased on the NYSE, a 
domestic exchange.  Investor B would be barred from recovery.  Yet 
ironically, Investors A and B might not have ever realized (nor cared), but-
for their eventual losses, where their particular shares were listed or 
purchased.  Furthermore, under the “transactional” test, the nationalities of 
Investors A and B are immaterial.  The test is primarily concerned with 
whether the stock was listed on a domestic or foreign exchange. 
In contrast, under the prior “conduct and effects test,” a court would 
likely have analyzed additional factors, such as “whether the harmed 
investors were Americans or foreigners . . . [or whether the] acts ‘of 
material importance’ performed in the United States ‘significantly 
contributed’ to [the alleged damages]” in deciding whether to apply Section 
10(b) to grant plaintiffs recovery.
128
  The “conduct and effects test” was 
malleable, unpredictable, and difficult to apply.  However, at least in the 
area of Securities Law, it allowed for great flexibility, enabling intuitively 
equitable outcomes by thoroughly considering unique factual scenarios. 
2. Morrison, After Dodd-Frank 
Congress’s attempt to reject the Court’s holding in fact only further 
muddled the confusion.  By essentially reinstating the “conduct and effects 
test” for SEC and Government actions, while leaving the “transactional” 
test in place for private actions, Congress created an additional possibility 
for arbitrariness in application of the law.  The Dodd-Frank provision in 
Section 929P, coupled with Morrison, is illustrated in the following 
scenarios: 
American Investor C purchases Vrooom! stock on the 
NYSE.  Fraud ensues.   
 
 128. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879 (2010).  
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American Investor D purchases Vrooom! stock on the TSE.  
Fraud ensues. 
Foreign Investor E purchases Vrooom! stock on the NYSE.  
Fraud ensues. 
Foreign Investor F purchases Vrooom! stock on the TSE.  
Fraud ensues.
129
 
In American Investor C’s case, the SEC and Government are able to 
bring actions against alleged wrongdoers, under both Morrison and Section 
929P.  American Investor C also has a private right of action under the 
Morrison “transactional” test, because the stock was listed on a domestic 
exchange.  This is the easy case. 
In American Investor D’s case, the SEC and Government are also able 
to bring actions against alleged wrongdoers, if the SEC or Government can 
show under Section 929P the requisite “substantial effect” with the United 
States.  Here, given Investor D’s American citizenship, this “substantial 
effect” would likely be found.  Unfortunately for American Investor D, he 
has no private legal right to recovery because his stock was listed and 
purchased on a foreign exchange, despite his citizenship ties to the United 
States.  Morrison’s transactional test applies, and because Section 929P 
fails to grant the more flexible “conduct and effects test” analysis to private 
actions, Investor D’s recovery in United States courts is barred. 
Meanwhile, foreign Investor E, who does not have any ties to the 
United States at all, except for having purchased Vrooom! shares on the 
NYSE, is entitled to a private cause of action in United States court under 
Morrison, simply because the stock was listed on the domestic exchange.  
Here, the SEC and Government can also bring a cause of action against 
alleged wrongdoers. 
Lastly, in foreign Investor F’s case, under Morrison, foreign Investor 
F cannot file a private cause of action in a United States court under 
Section 10(b), because the shares were listed on a foreign exchange.  
However, the SEC or Government would be able to commence a 
proceeding or criminal prosecution against the alleged wrongdoers if it 
could prove the second prong of the Dodd-Frank Section 929P “conduct 
and effects” analysis—that foreign Investor F’s purchase of shares on the 
TSE, though certainly “conduct occurring outside the United States[,] . . . 
has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.”
130
 
A careful consideration of each of these hypothetical outcomes reveals 
just how arbitrarily and unfairly certain private individuals might be 
afforded or denied legal remedies under the current law in United States 
 
 129. A graphical representation of Investors C–F’s outcomes can be found in the 
Appendix, Figure 2. 
 130. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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courts.  After all, in each scenario, the underlying wrong remains 
unchanged:  fraud ensues after an investor purchases a share of Vrooom! 
stock.  Such drastically different outcomes that turn upon where the stock is 
listed seem arbitrary.  It is arguments such as these that legal scholars and 
commentators have made in urging an extension of Section 929P to actions 
brought by private individual investors.  Arguably, this extension and 
effective restoration of the “conduct and effects” analysis would be the best 
for securities litigation, as a substantive area of law.  The “conduct and 
effects” test has its shortcomings in unpredictability and malleability; 
however, from a public policy perspective, it may be preferable to the 
“transactional” test for securities litigation, given the commonly cross-
border manner in which business is conducted today. 
C.  The Procedural Approach of Morrison, Bolstering the Presumption 
Against Extraterritoriality, Was Right and Thus the Presumption 
Retains Its Value 
Despite the occasionally bizarre results discussed in Part VI.B above, 
the value of the Supreme Court’s approach in Morrison should not be 
discounted from a jurisprudential perspective.  Though the substantive law 
implications of the case’s outcome, coupled with the subsequent Section 
929P provision in Dodd-Frank, have created confusion and ambiguity in 
this area, the broad presumption against extraterritoriality remains a useful 
judicial tool in spurring Congress to legislative action.  Consistent 
application of the presumption demands from Congress clarity of 
legislative intent in drafting new laws and taking action in amending old 
laws. 
Consideration of these post-Morrison events illustrates the 
presumption’s utility.  The Supreme Court employed a strictly textualist 
approach in its analysis.  Congress disagreed in part and clarified what it 
“meant to say” about the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b), at least 
with respect to SEC and Government actions in Dodd-Frank.  Congress 
also charged the SEC with soliciting public opinion and conducting more 
research with respect to private shareholder actions.  This process for 
dialogue, diligent research, and debate is a means to dynamically fine-tune 
the process of lawmaking, utilizing the duties of different branches in doing 
so. 
Though some may argue that, in the short term, this is highly 
inefficient, or perhaps sacrifices the interests of parties such as the foreign 
plaintiffs in Morrison purely for the evolution of the law, over time the 
judiciary’s consistent and faithful application of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality will send a clear message to Congress indicating sections 
of statutes that require more explicit clarification.  This will help avoid 
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instances of “judicial activism” and “judge-speculation-made law.”
131
 
Although, logically, a default presumption in favor of territoriality 
(and against extraterritoriality) may initially appear to do a poor job of 
matching with Congressional intent in a particular area of substantive law, 
it remains and should continue to remain an effective presumption for 
courts to use.  This default presumption is effective and desirable because 
it, when consistently applied over time, forces Congress to carefully state 
what it means to say more explicitly.  It is for this reason that, despite swift 
Congressional action in crafting and passing Section 929P of the Dodd-
Frank Act just three weeks after the Supreme Court issued its Morrison 
opinion, the Supreme Court still arguably reached the correct conclusion in 
its holding. 
The reasons for supporting the Supreme Court’s decision to renew a 
default presumption against extraterritoriality are twofold:  (1) damage-
minimization and (2) efficiency.  Past jurisprudence has shown that failure 
to faithfully and consistently apply the presumption against 
extraterritoriality leads to undesirable results.  An example of such 
undesirable results, as discussed above, is the forty-year-old line of Second 
Circuit jurisprudence in which “judge-speculation-made-law” piecemeal-
constructed the “conduct and effects tests” to determine the extraterritorial 
application of Section 10(b) in securities fraud claims.  This was the very 
same undesired result that the Supreme Court originally wished to avoid in 
American Banana, decades earlier, when it affirmatively endorsed the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. 
D.  Territoriality Is Nearly Obsolete Domestically, Yet Valued Abroad—
Diplomacy in Foreign Relations Accounts for This Difference 
As discussed above in Part II, Professor Beale’s bright-line territorial 
approach, though initially lauded for its “simplicity” in application, 
eventually gave way to the flexibility of the modern approaches in the 
domestic arena.  However, to appreciate the role that territoriality and ideas 
of sovereignty continue to play on the international stage, one must realize 
that conflicts between domestic sister-state laws are often a matter of 
differing public policy concerns between each state.  In contrast, in the 
 
 131. This is not the first instance of this interlude between the Supreme Court’s first 
issuing a ruling, only to have Congress swiftly overturn it with clearer, less ambiguous 
statutory language.  Consider Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian 
American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244 (1991), which held that Title VII protections 
against discrimination did not apply to an American citizen’s claim of alleged 
discrimination abroad, without clear statutory language of extraterritorial application, and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 USC §§ 
2000e(f), 2000e-1) for an illustration. 
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international arena, as a matter of foreign policy, United States courts 
should not insensitively impose our domestic laws on activities occurring 
in foreign countries, without very careful consideration of diplomacy and 
comity.  Heuristically, one would hope that if Congress had exercised the 
foresight to explicitly and in clear, unambiguous terms indicate the 
extraterritorial application of a particular statute, then presumably 
significant research and debate would already have taken place regarding 
such extraterritorial application, prior to the statute’s enactment. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Where the next few months or even years will take this issue, and how 
the currently pending cases will come out in light of Morrison and Section 
929, remains yet to be seen.  Although, substantively for the area of 
securities litigation, the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison when 
coupled with the Dodd-Frank Act created a flawed mechanism for analysis 
by courts, the application of the presumption as a procedural mechanism 
remains valuable. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 Investor A 
(Purchased Vrooom! 
Stock  
on the NYSE) 
Investor B 
(Purchased Vrooom! 
Stock  
on the TSE) 
Private Shareholder (SH) 
Action 
 
YES NO 
SEC/Government (Gov’t) 
Action 
 
YES NO 
Figure 1.  Graphical representation of the outcomes of Investors A and B, under 
the Morrison “transactional” test. 
 
 
  American 
Investor 
C 
(Purchased 
Vrooom! 
Stock on 
NYSE) 
American 
Investor 
D 
(Purchased 
Vrooom! 
Stock on 
TSE) 
Foreign 
Investor 
E 
(Purchased 
Vrooom! 
Stock on 
NYSE) 
Foreign 
Investor  
F 
(Purchased 
Vrooom! 
Stock on 
TSE) 
Pre-Morrison 
(Conduct and 
Effects Test) 
Private 
SH Action 
YES YES YES 
Likely, 
YES 
SEC/Gov’t 
 
YES YES YES 
Likely, 
YES 
Morrison 
(Transactional 
Test) 
Private 
SH Action 
YES NO YES NO 
SEC/Gov’t 
 
YES NO YES NO 
Morrison + 
DFA 
Private 
SH Action 
YES NO YES NO 
SEC/Gov’t 
 
YES YES YES 
Likely, 
YES 
Figure 2.  Graphical Representation of the outcomes of Investors C, D, E, and F, 
under each scenario: (1) Pre-Morrison, (2) Morrison, and (3) Morrison, together 
with Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 
